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Technological catching up, quality of exports and competitiveness:      
a sectoral perspective  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In explaining patterns of international specialisation economists commonly refer to the 
benchmark cases of North-North and North-South trade. In North-North trade frameworks, 
economies manufacture and export similar products, and market competition is ruled by the ability 
to introduce a new variety or to step up the quality ladder. In North-South trade cases, high-skill 
endowed economies manufacture and export innovative products, whereas low-skill endowed 
countries specialize in low-cost, imitated products. Very little is said about emerging market 
economies (EMEs) that are placed in between the two cases above. In fact, despite their lower level 
of per-capita income compared to the rich countries of the North, EMEs generally feature high 
growth rates of output and a catching-up process on the run; notwithstanding the differences with 
respect to advanced economies, these economies show a tendency towards a convergence in trade 
patterns. All this makes EMEs an attractive case study for international economists. Of special 
interest is the case of the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) that have recently joined 
the European Union (EU). Understanding the evolution of CEECs’ structure of trade and export 
competitiveness is particularly highlighting in the debate on the European enlargement process as a 
driver of economic convergence. Indeed, economic integration has fostered the exchange in goods 
and services, business contacts, and so on, and is thus expected to have promoted the dissemination 
of knowledge, i.e., the mechanism for accelerating the economic catching-up.1 The enlargement 
process is thus likely to have induced an increasing economic similarity between CEECs and the 
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 Yet, economic integration per se is not sufficient for a successful catching up; the so-called “advantage of relative 
backwardness” takes place only in the presence of “absorptive capacity” (Abramovitz 1986), i.e., the availability of 
technological capabilities, particularly in terms of skilled workers. This factor ultimately determines the ability or 
inability of any given country to exploit the dynamical gains from trade.  
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more advanced EU countries, which ought to be reflected in the evolution of trade patterns. A 
number of contributions in the literature addresses the issue of  CEECs’ trade structure convergence 
towards EU’s patterns; yet, limited attention has been drawn to the role of the enlargement process 
as a driver of CEECs’ technological catching up and export performance.2 With this paper we add 
to the above strand of literature. by providing a theoretical and empirical contribution to the analysis 
of the relationship between the evolution of CEECs’ competitiveness at the industry-level and the 
process of technological catching up induced by economic integration with more advanced EU 
economies. The novelty of our paper is the explanation of sectoral differences in export 
competitiveness and market shares’ growth as the result of a skill endowment-driven specialization 
that makes high skill-intensive (HS) firms able to benefit by economic integration, catch up 
technologically with more advanced European foreign firms, and succeed in “quality- dominated” 
markets.   
In view of validating the idea pursued in the paper, we develop a theoretical setup where we 
explicitly take into account sectoral differences in technological capabilities and skill intensities. 
This allows us to explain the different features of competitiveness in trade: HS firms face a “non-
price” competition in European markets based on the ability to succeed in the quality upgrading of 
manufactured products, whereas low-skill (LS) firms face a traditional price competition, 
fundamentally centred on the ability to preserve a lower labour cost dynamics. Hence, our analysis 
is set in a dynamical perspective, with a view to explaining market penetration for HS firms as the 
result of an innovation-driven quality upgrading process. To this end, we first derive analytically 
export functions where the relative quality content of any product determines its share in importer’s 
expenditure; we then explain the evolution of market shares with firms’ ability to improve the 
exports’ relative quality content . In this respect, we differ from Hallak (2006), since we model 
analytically the technological catching-up fuelled by economic integration as the engine of a 
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 Among the most recent contributions on this topic are the works by Cavallaro and Mulino (2008 and 2009a), Caporale 
et al. (2009). 
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dynamical process of increasing competitiveness in “quality-dominated” markets. To our 
knowledge, this aspect is completely new in the literature.  
As to the empirical analysis of the paper, we focus on the role of preference for quality in 
explaining trends in CEECs’ exports towards EU partners. We choose to preliminary regress unit 
value ratio (UVR) changes against several variables measuring domestic and foreign knowledge, 
that in our theoretical setup drive the process of quality upgrading. In a second step, on the basis of 
the estimation results that validate econometrically our assumption that the UVR is a good proxy for 
quality in the case of HS industries, we use the fitted UVR to build a “demand for quality” variable  
used in the estimation of HS’s market shares changes. Our econometric approach differs from 
Hallak (2010) where per-capita income is used to measure exports’ quality content. Indeed, here we 
are interested in emphasizing the evolution of CEECs’ trade patterns and understanding its 
determinants, and for  this purpose the use of a sectoral UVR is more appropriate, given that 
CEECs’ level of per-capita income is lower than EU members’, even though the quality content of 
their advanced products is comparable to EU’s.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of the literature on 
product quality and trade; Section 3 develops the basic relationships of the theoretical model, and 
derives export functions for HS and LS industries. Section 4 analyses the dynamical implications 
for market penetration of a price- or quality-based competitiveness, and formalizes the role of 
international knowledge diffusion as driver of a successful competitiveness in “quality-dominated” 
markets. Sections 5 develops the empirical analysis of the paper with reference to the CEECs. We 
first provide empirical evidence related to market penetration and price and quality competitiveness,  
at the industry level, for the period 2000-2007; we then test at the sectoral level the assumption that 
UVR provides an adequate proxy for quality in trade and finally estimate the role of quality 
upgrading in HS firms’ market shares changes over the period considered. Section 6 draws some 
final conclusions.  
2. Product quality and trade: a survey of the literature 
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This paper contributes to the existing theoretical and empirical literature on the role of 
product quality in trade, pioneered by Linder (1961). Linder predicted that similar countries would 
trade more intensely with one other, as they share similar production and consumption patterns. 
Since firms in the manufacturing sector respond primarily to domestic demand, high-income 
countries specialize in high-quality goods for the domestic market, and then become exporters of 
such goods to countries with similar per-capita income.  
Although the “Linder hypothesis” encloses both a supply- and a demand-side explanation of 
the relationship between product quality and trade, research in this area has focused distinctively on 
the two aspects. As to the production side, some authors point to the relationship between per-capita 
income and quality production, and find evidence of a strong correlation between export prices and 
countries’ per-capita income, in that richer countries export higher quality goods at higher prices 
(Hummels and Klenow, 2005). The explanation, as in Murphy and Shleifer (1997) and Schott 
(2004), is based on factor endowments considerations: capital- and skill-abundant countries exploit 
their advantage in the production of higher quality goods, that command a relatively higher market 
price. In the same vein, but in a North-South context, Flam and Helpman (1987) and Stokey (1991) 
present a quality-based product cycle model where Northern countries that engage in R&D activity 
manufacture and export innovative, higher quality products, whereas Southern countries have a 
comparative advantage in low-cost, labour-intensive productions and export imitated products. As a 
result, rich countries’ endowment-driven comparative advantage in the production of vertically 
superior varieties brings about differences in per-capita income, which are reflected in the observed 
international patterns of consumption. As to the demand-side, most contributions investigate the 
relationship between per-capita income and demand for quality; evidence of wealthier countries 
consuming high-quality goods in larger proportions than poorer countries is provided by Bils and 
Klenow (2001), Brooks (2006), Hallak (2006), Verhoogen (2008). The last two authors offer a 
theoretical foundation of the empirical results based on non-homotheticities in the demand for 
quality, that makes countries differ in their willingness to pay for vertically superior varieties.  
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Despite the numerous empirical validations of the role of quality in trade, the Linder 
hypothesis as such has found scarce empirical support. Hallak (2010) shows that the above failure is 
due to the systematic bias induced by the aggregation across sectors. Hallak’s theoretical framework 
includes both quality demand and supply: countries’ expenditure shares on different quality 
products varies with per-capita income, whereas quality supply is assumed to be systematically 
related to per capita income. The combination of the above demand and supply determinants into a 
gravitational-type specification leads to the estimation of bilateral trade flows at the sectoral level, 
where differences in cross-country income per capita represent the Linder term. This turns out to be 
significant and with the correct sign.  
As to the role of quality in trade with specific reference to the CEECs, the contributions in 
the literature are not numerous. Aturupane et al. (1999) find that trade of similar goods of different 
quality (vertical intra-industry trade) have been gaining a predominant role in two-way trade 
between CEECs and richer EU-15, as early as the first half of the 1990s. The authors link the above 
evolution to inward FDI as well as skill intensity of production and imports of intermediate goods. 
Subsequent contributions emphasize that CEECs exports’ improvement have been due especially to 
the specialization in up-market, up-quality products. In fact, with reference to a sub-set of these 
countries, Dullek et al. (2005) show that over the period 1995-2000 the composition of exports 
towards EU-15 has shifted towards higher-quality segments within industries. Benkovskis et al. 
(2010) confirm that the above is an on-going process, showing that a large part of the increase in the 
prices of CEECs’ exports towards the EU in the period 1999-2009 results from improving quality, 
albeit the quality level of CEECs’ exports is still lagging behind in comparison with German 
exports. The link between CEECs’ quality upgrading in manufactured products and their 
competitiveness in EU markets is addressed by Cavallaro and Mulino (2008) where evidence is 
found of an increased market penetration of CEEC’s exports over the period 1995-2005, linked to 
the increasing role of intra-industry trade and vertical differentiation and a process of specialization 
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in higher quality products.  The association between CEECs’ quality upgrading and their increase of 
(world) market shares is also highlighted by Fabrizio et al. (2007). 
 
3. The theoretical model 
 We consider an emerging economy that trades with a technologically more advanced foreign 
country, where we distinguish between HS firms that engage in research activity and manufacture 
advanced products, and LS firms that manufacture traditional products. As in recent trade theory, 
the framework considered is that of a semi-small open economy, where imported goods are 
purchased at given world prices, and producers of final goods compete monopolistically in 
international markets, given that traded products substitute imperfectly for each other in 
households’ demand. We assume no tariffs, transportation costs or other trade barriers, and that all 
factors of production are immobile. 
3.1 The supply side 
We distinguish between two types of final products: advanced and traditional.  The N 
differentiated advanced goods - indexed by n, with Nin ,...,,...,1=   -  are manufactured with high-
skilled labour and an aggregate of advanced intermediate inputs that embody quality improvements 
stemming from research activity. As in new-Schumpeterian quality ladder models, firms that 
manufacture innovative intermediates engage in research activity in order to create blueprints. 
When they succeed in up-front research they have the ability to gain industry leadership for the 
innovative product. We characterize the typical HS firm that manufactures the advanced final 
product, iY , by the following technology: 
 
αα −
=
1
iiii AHFY                             (1) 
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where iH  is employment of high-skilled labour, iA  the amount of intermediates in the manufacture 
of the final product by firm i and iF  is an arbitrary constant reflecting the choice of units.
3
 We 
follow Grossman and Helpman (1991) in modeling the intermediate goods sector and assume that 
firms employ a fixed assortment of vertically differentiated intermediate inputs, indicated by the 
following index: 
 dzZqlogAlog
z
zz∫ ∑ 





=
1
0
κκ   (2) 
where κzZ  represents the component z , of the κ
th
 generation, in the index A,  whose quality is κzq . 
To simplify we let the innovation process be such that each new intermediate provides γ  additional 
services with respect to the good of the previous generation, that is ( )1−= κκ γ zz qq , with 1>γ .  
The research sector is portrayed as in the patent-race literature. Firms target their research 
effort at the quality upgrading of any leading-edge production process; they issue equity to finance 
the R&D race and use a constant-return-to-scale technology where skilled labour is the only input. 
Any firm that engages RH  labour resources in industry z at time t is able to produce the new good 
with probability Hι .
4
 The probability of gaining success in lab activity is proportional to the 
resources devoted: to achieve a research intensity of Hι , it is necessary to invest HHRH ιl≡  units 
of labour services per unit of time, where 
Hl
1
 is the productivity of labour in research. Firms will 
invest labour in research activity up to the amount for which the cost of R&D activity equals the 
expected revenues.  
                                               
3
 To save on notation we have omitted the time index.   
4
 The arrival of research successes is guided by a Poisson process, with ι  denoting the parameter of the density 
function. Although the arrival of research successes among firms is guided by independent Poisson processes, by the 
law of large numbers, the process of technological advance at the aggregate level is smooth and non-random. See 
Grossman and Helpman (1991). 
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As to the manufacture of advanced intermediates A, firms use a constant-return-to-scale 
technology that employs only labour. Given monopolistic competition and limit pricing outcome, 
all intermediates bear the same price. Since better quality inputs are more productive, in that they 
allow to produce a higher-quality final good, producers of final goods buy only state-of-the-art 
varieties. Given that all demanded components zZ  are employed in equal quantities, the aggregate 
intermediate A can be expressed as ZqA =  where Z denotes the aggregate volume of intermediates 
and q
 
is an index of the productivity of intermediates which is proportional to the total “number” of 
R&D successes. Hence, the resulting quality content embodied in advanced final products reflects 
the country’s state of knowledge, at a given time t.  
In addition, in the economy there are M differentiated traditional products - indexed by m, 
with Mjm ,...,,...,1=
 
- that are manufactured with low-skilled workers. The representative LS firm 
that manufactures a traditional product j is characterized by the following technology: 
 
( )βBLFY jjj =                             (3) 
where jF  is an arbitrary constant reflecting the choice of units, jL is employment of low-skilled 
labour and B  denotes a learning-by-doing process that increases workers’ productivity. In 
particular, we assume learning by doing to be linked to the stock of knowledge accumulated in the 
economy. The idea is that the innovative activity taking place in the HS industry leads to the spread 
of general knowledge that may be partly seized by LS firms. Since domestic knowledge is 
embodied in advanced intermediate inputs, we assume the learning-by-doing process to be linked to 
the production of these intermediates. At the same time, economic integration with more advanced 
economies favours the diffusion of foreign knowledge, in particular through the channel of foreign 
direct investments. We thus posit ( )( )εεµ −∗= 1AAB , with 0,0 <′′>′ µµ , where µ  is a function 
denoting the LS firm’s ability to absorb externally generated knowledge present in the public 
domain. We assume that the contribution of the accumulated knowledge to LS firms’ productivity 
growth exhibits decreasing returns due to the difficulties of learning in the presence of growing 
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complexity of advanced intermediates and sectoral specificities. Parameters ε  and ( )ε−1  are the 
weights of the domestic and foreign sources of learning, that is, A and ∗A , respectively.  
3.2 The demand side 
Preferences of any domestic household h are described by the following intertemporal utility 
function  
 
( ) dtueU ht
th log∫
∞
−−
=
τ
τρ
τ  (4) 
where ρ represents the subjective discount rate and htu  the following instantaneous utility function:  
          ( ) ( ) αα −= 1hThAht CCu  (5) 
where  
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( ) ( ) ( )( ) TTTT
m Fmm Hm
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T CCMMC σ
σσσ
1
*
1
∑∑ ∗++=
−∗
           (7) 
In  equation (5) hAC  denotes consumption of advanced goods and hTC  of traditional 
products.  Equation (6) states that hAC  is a function of the level of consumption of each domestic 
advanced good n, ),( nHC κ , and of each foreign advanced good ∗n , ( )**,nFC κ , where 
∗∗∗
= Nin ,...,,...,1 .  Each distinct advanced product may be manufactured in an infinite number of 
ways, corresponding to a different vintage κ ; different vintages of a given product substitute 
perfectly for one other, once the appropriate adjustment is made for the different quality levels; 
)(κHq  is the quality level embodied in vintage κ  of any domestic advanced good, and analogously 
( )*κFq  is the quality level embodied in vintage ∗κ  of any foreign high-tech good. Equations (5)-(7) 
state that each consumer maximizes static utility by devoting a fraction α of her expenditure to the 
set of advanced goods and the remaining fraction to the set of traditional goods; within the 
 10
advanced set, preferences over home and foreign products are modelled according to a quality-
adjusted CES function, so that the whole set of the N domestic and ∗N  foreign varieties, are 
demanded. Thus, once the distribution of expenditure across advanced and traditional goods has 
been set, the consumer first selects among generations of any available domestic and foreign 
product, n and ∗n , the brand of vintage κˆ  and ∗κˆ  that carries the lowest quality-adjusted price; she 
then allocates expenditure among the whole set of ∗+ NN  products according to the relative prices 
and relative quality content.5 The functional form (6) implies a constant elasticity of substitution 
between advanced goods, given that 
A
A
A θ
θ
σ
1−
= ,  where  Aθ  is the constant elasticity of 
substitution between each pair of advanced goods. The weight of each good in the consumption of 
the advanced bundle is proportional to its quality level )(κHq  or *)(κFq ; ω  is a positive parameter 
that measures the household’s intensity of preference for quality, as in Hallak (2006), Crinò and 
Epifani (2010). 
 As to traditional goods, hTC  is a function of the level of consumption of each traditional 
domestic good m, HmC , and each foreign good ∗m , *FmC , where ∗∗∗ = Mjm ,...,,...,1 . Equation (7) 
assumes a constant elasticity of substitution between traditional goods, given that 
T
T
T θ
θ
σ
1−
= , 
where Tθ  is the constant elasticity of substitution between each pair of traditional goods; moreover, 
all traditional goods enter hTC  symmetrically.  
                                               
5
 Once the above two static maximization problems have been solved, the optimal allocation of expenditure across time 
is readily obtained as the solution to a standard intertemporal maximization problem. The occurrence of a two-stage 
static optimization problem stems from the presence of both a vertical and a horizontal dimension in consumer’s 
preferences. See Grossman and Helpman (1991).  
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 Optimal allocation of expenditure across the N domestic and ∗N
 
foreign (state-of-the-art) 
products implies the following demand function for domestic advanced consumption good i,  iHC , 
with quality Hq and price HiP  (see Appendix for details):  
 ( )( ) A
h
HA
Hih
Hi P
EQ
P
PC A
A αθ
θ
1−
−






=  (8) 
where hEα  denotes the representative consumer’s share of expenditure over advanced goods, AP  
the advanced goods price index consistent with the quality-adjusted CES type of preferences, and 
where ( )
( ) ( )∑ ∑
=
∗
∗
∗
+
≡
N
n
N
n
FH
H
H
qq
qQ
1
ωω
ω
. Equation (8) shows the role of the relative quality content of 
goods in the structure of demand for advanced products. In fact, HQ
 
is a “distribution” parameter  
in that it gives the share of the (advanced goods) expenditure devoted to domestic good i , for given 
relative prices.   
Analogously, with respect to the demand for any domestic traditional good ,j  we obtain a 
demand function of the form: 
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where ( ) hEα−1  represents the representative consumer’s share of expenditure over traditional 
goods and TP  is the traditional goods price index consistent with the CES-type of preferences. 
 Comparison of equations (8) and (9) makes evident the implications of the inclusion of the 
quality dimension in consumers’ preferences. To see this clearly, we re-express relative demand 
between any domestic and foreign advanced product and between any domestic and foreign 
traditional product, respectively, as: 
( )1−−
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The above equations show that for given relative prices and elasticity of substitution, relative 
demand for advanced goods depends on products’ quality ratio; moreover the higher is the intensity 
of quality preference, ω , the more relative quality matters. Our result is in line with Hallak (2006) 
that argues that high-quality products have easy access to rich markets where high-income 
consumers are more quality oriented. On the contrary, relative demand for traditional products 
depends only on relative prices, for any given elasticity of substitution, just as in traditional CES-
type preferences.  
We now focus on the emerging country’s exports, that is, on foreign demand for advanced 
and traditional products. To this end we let the structure of foreign preferences to be symmetric to 
the one given in equation (5)  so that, at each time t, the representative foreign household’s demand 
for any (domestic) advanced product i is given by substituting her intensity of preference for 
quality, ∗ω , and her expenditure, 
∗hEα . Same applies to non-residents’ demand for any domestic 
traditional product j .  
At each time t, exports of high-tech domestic goods are obtained by aggregating the 
individual demand functions for the whole set of N domestic advanced goods:  
  
( )∑ ∑
∗
−
−





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=
*
1
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h
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Correspondingly, exports of traditional domestic goods are given by: 
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4. Market penetration and quality dynamics  
The focus now is on the dynamical implications of the different kind of competitiveness 
faced by HS and LS firms, as resulting from the two functional forms obtained above - equations 
(10) and (11). To see this we look at the evolution of HS and LS market shares. We define the 
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market share of domestic HS firms as the ratio of non-residents’ imports, AX , to non-residents’ 
purchases of advanced products manufactured in their own country, AG . Given the monopolistic 
competition setting, where all domestic HS firms have identical technology and face the same 
demand, we have a symmetric equilibrium,6 with all domestic firms of the advanced industries 
fixing the same price, AHHi PP = . Thus, we may reformulate equation (10) as  
 
( ) ∗−
−






= EQ
P
PNX A
A
HA
A
HA αθ
θ
1
1
                (12) 
where, now, ∗Eα  denotes aggregate foreign expenditure over the EME’s advanced products, 
expressed in terms of the domestic currency. In turn, by assuming AFFi PP =∗ , the equation for non-
residents’ purchases of advanced products manufactured in their own country is 
 
( ) ∗−
−






= EQ
P
PNG A
A
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A
FA αθ
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1
*
 
(13)
 
The evolution of high-tech products’ market shares is then readily derived by taking the 
logarithmic differentiation with respect to time of the ratio of equations (12) and (13):  
 ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]FHAFAHAAA qqPPGX ~~~~1~~ −−−−=− ∗ωθ
 
 (14) 
It appears clearly that market penetration abroad depends on the evolution of both the pure 
price term and the quality differential term; the weight of the latter depends on the intensity of 
foreign consumers’ preference for quality. The implications for competitiveness and export 
orientation are twofold: firms that well-perform in “quality dominated markets” are able to expand 
along the “intensive margin”, that is, to gain market shares even at constant or increasing relative 
prices. Moreover, were the intensity of quality demand related to consumers’ income as stated in 
Hallak (2006), high-tech innovative goods would find easier markets in high-income countries. 
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 The authors develop the general equilibrium analysis for a similar model in a previous paper (Cavallaro and Mulino, 2009); 
interested readers may refer to that paper for details.  
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As regards LS industries, the evolution of market shares is obtained by restating equation 
(11) for non-residents’ imports as 
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where THHj PP =  and where ( ) ∗− Eα1  denotes aggregate foreign expenditure over the EME’s 
traditional products, expressed in terms of the domestic currency. Given TFFj PP =∗ , the equation for 
non-residents’ purchases of traditional products manufactured in their own country is 
 
( ) ∗
−
∗
∗
−





+
= E
P
P
MM
MG
T
T
T
FT α
θ
1
1
 (16) 
so that the evolution of market shares for low-tech products is 
 ( )( )TFTHTTT PPGX ~~1~~ −−=− θ  (17) 
It appears that firms of LS industries can only engage in a traditional “price competition” in 
order to penetrate foreign markets. In this respect, the learning-by-doing technology brings about 
labour productivity increases that loosen the pressure on wages which is required to keep market 
shares constant. It turns out that the innovation activity in the advanced sector has positive external 
effects on the traditional firms too, and hence the determinants of the pace of innovation in the 
advanced sector of the economy are important for the overall evolution of the country’s 
performance in international markets.  
As standard in neo-Schumpeterian growth models, we assume that firms step up the quality 
ladder thanks to innovations resulting from the devotion of labour resources to research activity. In 
our analysis we consider international spillovers as important factors in the building up of an 
emerging economy’s stock of knowledge, and hence take as relevant for the process of quality 
upgrading a concept of knowledge capital that includes both domestic and foreign know-how.7 
                                               
7
 We consider international R&D spillovers, FDI, business contacts, as the means that may convey technology transfers 
within our theoretical framework. As suggested in Keller (2004), the above are among the strongest form of knowledge 
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Some contributions in the literature8 include international knowledge spillovers in models where 
innovation activity is conceived as a horizontal process of increasing varieties. Here, we focus on a 
vertical innovation process and assume the following technology for quality upgrading (see 
Cavallaro and Mulino, 2008): 
γlog
H
R
H
H HK
dt
dq
l
=    (18) 
where HK is the economy’s overall stock of knowledge capital, at a given time t, specified as  
[ ]FHH qqKK ,= . Equation (18) states that the productivity of labor resources in research, 
Hl
1
 , is 
increased by the stock of knowledge capital HK , as standard in innovation-driven endogenous 
growth models with international knowledge spillovers. We  take  )(⋅K  to be increasing in both 
arguments and homogeneous of degree one. The latter assumption allows us to define the 
“intensive” function ( )[ ]HF qqK /,1≡Ψ  such that ( )HFHH qqqK /Ψ= . The function ( )⋅Ψ   reflects 
the existence of international spillovers. The case of no international spillovers is one where  
( ) 1/ ≡Ψ HF qq
 - or any positive constant.  
 Rearranging, we can express the growth rate of quality in the research sector as: 
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   (19) 
where 





F
H
q
q
 is a measure of the knowledge gap between the two countries. Equation (19) 
emphasizes the convergence pattern of integrated economies: the growth of quality over time is 
positively related to the technological disadvantage of the laggard country, given its capacity to 
                                                                                                                                                            
diffusion. Intermediate goods, which also are emphasized in some contributions in the literature (See Maggi et al., 
2009, among the others) have to be excluded in our analysis, being non-traded by assumption). 
8
 See, among the others, Grossman and Helpman (1991), Smulders (2004), Leon-Ledesma (2005). 
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benefit by the international dissemination of knowledge, as represented by the specific functional 
form adopted for ( ).⋅Ψ
 
   
In conclusion, economic integration with more advanced countries exerts a twofold positive 
effect: on one side, it speeds up the technological catching up and exports’ quality upgrading; on the 
other side, it provides easy access to rich markets where high-income consumers are more quality 
oriented. The model predicts that the positive impulses to the modern, dynamic industries are also 
indirectly beneficial to the traditional sectors of the economy. 
 
5. Export quality, technology and market penetration of CEECs: econometric analysis 
In this section we estimate for CEECs equation (14) of the theoretical model,9 which states 
that the growth rate of market shares depends on a pure price term and a “demand for quality” term.    
Given the focus on the role of product quality in trade, our preliminary concern is the 
appropriate measure of quality to be used in the econometric estimation. The empirical literature 
suggests two alternative possibilities: the use of either a total factor productivity measure 
(Verhoogen, 2008, Crinò and Epifani, 2010), or indicators based on export unit values (Greenaway 
et al., 1995, Fontagné and Freudenberg, 1997, Schott, 2004, Hummels and Klenow, 2005, Hallak 
and Schott, 2011). In our analysis we follow the latter approach, and build a unit value ratio to be 
used as a proxy for relative quality in the estimation of equation (14). We validate its use by 
running a preliminary regression in order to test the influence on UVR changes of several 
technological variables lying behind the accumulation of knowledge capital, that in our analysis are 
at the root of the process of quality upgrading. On the basis of the results obtained that confirm that 
for HS industries UVR is a good proxy for quality, we use the fitted values of UVR to build the 
                                               
9
 For the CEECs we only consider the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia, because of missing data on 
technological variables for the other countries, whereas among the EU-15 countries we do not consider Luxembourg, 
owing to its small dimension. 
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“demand for quality” term in our estimation of market shares changes between 2000 and 2007. The 
choice of performing regressions on the overall changes instead of using panel data techniques is 
due to the high number of missing sectoral data, especially for domestic R&D expenditure. Given 
our focus on basic long–term trends we leave aside data referring to 2008 onward for the adverse 
impact of the recent global financial crisis on output growth and the volumes of trade, as well as 
other important variables considered in our estimation, such as FDI flows and R&D expenditure.  
5.1 Data and descriptive evidence 
        Trade data are taken from Eurostat COMEXT database, which reports values and quantities 
for industrial products according to the 8-digit level Combined Nomenclature classification (CN8). 
The breakdown of exports according to skill intensities is based on the NACE (DA-DN) 
classification that divides manufactured products into 14 industries. Following a standard 
classification, we consider as HS industries Chemical Products (DG), Machinery and Equipments 
(DK), Electrical and Optical Equipments (DL) and Transport Equipments (DM). In addition, some 
studies (Esposito and Stehrer 2009; Landesmann et al. 2009) suggest that CEECs are relatively skill 
intensive in Paper, Printing and Publishing (DE) as well as Coke and Refined Petroleum Products 
(DF) industries, whereas skill-biased technical change has been strongly concentrated in skill-
intensive industries (Esposito and Stehrer 2009). Accordingly, we also include these industries 
among the HS. All other industries are classified as LS. As common in most empirical 
contributions, we define the market share of a given industry as the ratio of exports of the reporter 
country to the total imports of the partner country from the EU-25 area.10 We consider only intra-
EU trade because of the strong linkages in manufacturing processes and the relevance of trade 
relationship for CEECs. We obtain trade at constant values by evaluating 2000 quantities at 2007 
unit values; we then aggregate them into HS and LS industries. 
                                               
10
 We exclude from the sample Cyprus and Malta due to their small size. 
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Consistently with our definition of market shares, the UVR is the ratio between reporter k 
export unit values towards partner j and total intra-EU import unit values of the partner, for each 
type of industry i  ( jkiUVR , ), and is built as a weighted average of the relative unit values at product 
level,11 where the weights are the shares of each product’s export in the industry’s total exports.12 
We dropped observations belonging to the upper and lower 5% of the distribution, since large 
differences in unit values point to a composition effect within product categories, that is, to the 
presence of heterogeneous goods; in this case, it is likely that price differences are not associated 
with differences in the goods’ quality content. In addition, we consider that aggregate UVR of a 
fixed-products dataset can change either because of changes in the relative prices of products 
(“within” product changes), or because of the changing composition of the basket (“between” 
products changes), with the latter denoting changes in the export specialisation towards a different 
composition of the basket. Therefore, in order to isolate “pure” relative price changes, we purge 
composition effects by computing the within-product component of the UVR growth (UVRw, 
henceforth) by weighting product-level relative prices with the initial export volume: 
∑
∑
∑
∑
=
r
vEU
r
vEU
r
r
vEU
r
vEU
tr
r
vk
r
vk
r
r
vk
r
vk
tr
vk
ts p
p
p
p
UVRw
,
*
,
2000,
,
*
,
,
,
*
,
2000,
,
*
,
,
,
, η
η
η
η
   with   
∑
=
r
rr
rr
r yp
yp
2000,2000,
2000,2000,η  (20) 
where  t is the time period, p is the price of the generic product r belonging to industry s, η  is the 
share of each product in total industry’s export value and the superscripts indicate the origin (k, EU) 
and destination (v) markets.  
                                               
11
 We consider narrowly defined product categories at the CN8 level.  
12
 The UVR we build is analogous to the ones present in Greenaway et al. (1995) and Fontagné and Freudenberg (1997), 
among the others. Alternative measures of product quality based on export unit values have been operationalized in the 
literature. For instance, Hallak and Schott (2011) decompose observed export prices into quality and pure price 
components, thanks to the use of information on consumers’ evaluation of products inferred from countries’ trade 
balances. 
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 As to the variables related to the accumulation of knowledge capital, we consider R&D 
expenditure for both CEECs4 and EU. Data are from Eurostat13 and OECD, respectively. We then 
use  FDI data from the WIIW database on Foreign Direct Investments, that includes FDI stocks and 
flows in each industry for Central and Eastern European countries. As to the variables referring to 
the demand side, we include a “Linder term”14 (QDEM) where changes in quality, proxied by 
changes in UVRw, interact with foreign per-capita GDP in order to capture the intensity of 
preference for quality. Per-capita GDP is from Eurostat. 
In Table 1 we present data on UVR, market shares and price determinants, i.e., unit labour 
costs and innovation costs, over the period 2000-2007. These trends highlight the different features 
of competitiveness in trade for HS and LS industries. In particular, the figures related to the UVR, 
UVRw and market shares point to a striking different performance between the two kind of 
industries. It is worth noticing the sizeable increase in market shares for HS industries, slightly 
below 75%, matched by the positive change in both UVR indexes which is stronger for the within 
products component (29%). Albeit starting from a lower level, at the end of the period HS industries 
recorded higher market shares than LS industries. The fact that firms in HS industries gain market 
shares at increasing UVRs is an evidence of the ability to penetrate foreign markets not so much by 
reducing prices as by innovating. This points to an innovation-driven successful competition in 
“quality dominated” markets (Aiginger 1997; Cavallaro and Mulino 2008, 2009a). On the other 
hand, firms in LS industries record a modest 16%  increase in their market shares, associated with 
approximately the same price changes. 
Table 1 – Unit value ratios, market shares, price determinants: levels and growth rates, CEECs-4 
 
High-skill industries Low-skill industries 
 
2000 2007 growth 2000 2007 growth 
                                               
13
 We filled missing values of R&D expenditure by imputing the average value calculated for high-tech and traditional 
industries separately. 
14
 In Linder (1961) the demand for high-quality goods depends on the consumer’s level of income.  
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rate rate 
UVR* 1.04 1.20 15% 0.95 1.07 13% 
UVRw* 1.04 1.34 29% 0.95 1.09 15% 
Market shares* 2.15 3.74 74% 2.89 3.35 16% 
Wages (annual) (€)** 5972 7848 31% 4548 6033 33% 
Lab Prod. (€)** 57204 94609 65% 35808 57699 61% 
Real R&D (mn€)*** 730 1157 58% 252 196 -22% 
Real FDI (mn€)**** 15339 37103 142% 14390 30193 110% 
Sources: *Own elaboration on COMEXT data; **WIIW Industrial database on Eastern Europe; ***Eurostat; ****WIIW 
Foreign Direct Investment Database.  
Wages, productivity, R&D and market shares are expressed in constant (2000) prices. 
 
Table 1 shows the sizeable increases in wages both in HS and LS industries, coupled with a 
remarkable favourable evolution of labour productivity; overall, throughout the period considered, 
CEECs-4 exports wellperform in terms of traditional price competitiveness. As to innovation costs, 
R&D expenditure records a noticeable growth in HS industries, and a sizeable fall in traditional 
industries. In addition, the Table also reports data on the growth rate of inward FDI for both types 
of industries. As known, this variable acts as a technological vehicle for domestic innovation 
activity, by means of both “pure” knowledge spillovers and spillovers passing through vertical and 
horizontal linkages (van Pottelsberghe and Lichtenberg 2001, Keller 2004). The Table shows a 
faster increase for HS industries than for LS industries. Summing up, data point to a sound  
evidence of increasing competitiveness in EU markets for CEECs HS industries. In addition, data 
provide a clear indication that domestic and foreign technology have played a role in fostering 
export penetration, particularly for HS industries.  
5.2 The effect of domestic and foreign technology on export unit values 
The first estimation aims at capturing the part of the UVRw change due to quality 
upgrading in HS industries. Following equation (19) we assume that this process is positively 
influenced by both domestic and foreign knowledge. 
Among the regressors, we include the initial value of the relative price, in order to test the 
effect of the initial quality gap: according to equation (19) of the theoretical model, a country’s 
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relative technological disadvantage can be a positive determinant of a catching-up process among 
integrated economies. As to technological variables, domestic knowledge is proxied by the 
domestic sectoral R&D expenditure (RD), whereas foreign knowledge is accounted for by 
considering the stock of inward FDI and foreign R&D expenditure. Our assumption that knowledge 
spillover effects are fostered by the absorptive capacity of the exporting industry is tested by 
including an interaction term between inward FDI and domestic RD: the expected sign of the 
coefficient of this interaction term is positive. In addition, we interact inward FDI with R&D 
expenditure of the partner country, as in Léon-Ledesma (2005), in order to take into account the 
FDI technological content; the expected influence of the latter interaction term is positive, too.  
The resulting equation is the following: 
vs
k
k
s
s
vvk
s
k
s
k
s
k
s
k
s
vk
s
vk
s
RDRDFDI
RDFDIRDFDIUVRwUVRw
,65
432
,
10
,
lnln*ln
ln*lnlnlnlnln
εγγββ
βββββ
+++++
+++++=∆
∑∑
     (21)    
where subscript s refers to the industry while superscripts k and v refer to the reporter and partner 
countries, respectively. We estimate the above equation by carrying out both OLS and Instrumental 
Variables regressions on the overall changes between 2000 and 2007. The use of the IV estimator is 
justified by measurement errors and the possibility of a mean-reversion bias arising from symmetric 
shocks specific to the initial year and from sectoral asymmetric shocks, that would affect the 
coefficient of the initial UVRw. In order to address this problem we run IV estimates using the 
average manufacturing unit value ratio of 1999 as instrument. We include sector- and reporter-
specific dummies ( sγ  and kγ ) while partner-specific fixed effects are not included as they are 
jointly not significant and cause multicollinearity. Obviously, the evolution of relative prices 
depends also on traditional cost determinants; consequently, we run the above estimation adding the 
growth rate of real wages and labour productivity. However, the results are not affected by the 
additional variables, since most of their effects are captured by the reporter- and sector-specific 
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dummies.15 The results are presented in Table 2. As a control, we estimate equation (21) also for the 
sub-sample of LS industries where, according to our model, quality plays no role, so that changes in 
relative prices only reflect changes in unit labour costs.   
By looking at Table 2, it appears that the instrument works fine, and both the weak 
identification and under identification tests are rejected. With reference to IV estimates for HS 
industries, from column (3) we see that the stock of inward FDI is not significant even after 
controlling for both domestic and foreign R&D. Similarly, the latter two variables do not exert a 
significant impact either. On the contrary, when we add the interaction terms the coefficient for the 
inward FDI stock (column (4)) turns significant at 1% level and with the expected positive sign. In 
addition, both the interaction terms are positive and significant. The above result confirms the 
importance of CEECs-4 absorptive capacity for the effective ability to exploit foreign know how. 
The positive sign of the interaction term between FDI and the partner’s R&D suggests that 
spillovers arising from the stock of foreign technology through inward FDI are positively correlated 
with the partner’s research activity. Overall, UVRw changes respond positively to technological 
variables, thus validating the hypothesis that changes in product quality are adequately proxied by 
changes in the UVRw. Finally, the OLS estimates in columns (1) and (2) do no differ from the 
corresponding IV ones, indicating that the endogeneity problem does not affect the results. 
Turning to LS industries (columns (5) to (8)), we see that none of the regressors exerts a 
positive and significant impact on the “within” relative unit value, and this confirms that price 
changes are not systematically related to innovation costs in these industries. The only significant 
variables are the initial relative price and the stock of inward FDI, both with a negative sign. The 
negative sign of inward FDI is explainable in terms of the unit-cost reduction effect of this 
investment activity, a result in line with the theoretical assumption of learning-by-doing driven 
productivity gains in these industries. Overall, the results obtained for LS industries validate the 
assumption of market penetration based on a traditional price competition. 
                                               
15
 The results are available upon request. 
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Table 2 -  Technological determinants of “within” relative prices changes.  
  High-skill industries Low-skill industries 
 
OLS OLS IV IV OLS OLS IV IV 
lnUVRwsk,v -0.727*** -0.738*** -0.785*** -0.768*** -0.832*** -0.828*** -0.695*** -0.710*** 
 
[0.094] [0.092]    [0.120] [0.117]    [0.066] [0.065]    [0.132] [0.128] 
lnFDIsk 0.006 0.100* 0.010 0.103** -0.074** -0.124**  -0.062 -0.120* 
 
[0.044] [0.061]    [0.043] [0.051]    [0.037] [0.056]    [0.039] [0.065] 
R&Dsk -0.009 -0.022 -0.009 -0.022 -0.007 -0.004 -0.009 -0.006 
 
[0.017] [0.016]    [0.014] [0.015]    [0.011] [0.010]    [0.012] [0.012] 
lnFDIsk *lnR&Dsk  0.017*    0.017*  0.016  0.016 
  
[0.009]    
 [0.010]     [0.011]     [0.011] 
lnR&Dv 0.035 -0.046 0.033 -0.048 0.017 0.035 0.023 0.044 
 
[0.046] [0.058]    [0.047] [0.056]    [0.049] [0.054]    [0.042] [0.050] 
lnFDIsk *lnR&Dv  0.502**   0.504**   -0.15  -0.171 
  
[0.230]    
 [0.201]     [0.151]     [0.158] 
Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Obs 263 263 263 263 372 372 357 357 
R-sq 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.39 0.39 0.44 0.44 0.44 
Under-id§   70.0*** 71.6***   56.6*** 58.8*** 
Weak-id§§     90.6 92.7     64.4 67 
.
 Standard errors in Brackets; * significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. §Anderson canonical 
correlation LM statistic; §§ Cragg-Donald Wald statistic. Instrument used: average unit value.  
 
Summing up, we find evidence that in HS industries UVRw is positively influenced by 
technological variables. The estimates confirm the theoretical assumptions that technological 
spillovers are effective in fostering quality upgrading in CEECs-4 HS industries and that the former 
are larger the higher the absorptive capacity. The above results, as expected, do not apply to LS 
industries. 
5.3 Demand for quality and market shares 
We are now able to estimate equation (14) of the theoretical model that underlines the 
relevance of both price and quality competitiveness in the trends of CEECs-4’ market shares with 
respect to EU-14 partner countries. Given the theoretical assumption, validated by the econometric 
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analysis of section 5.2, that quality matters only for trade in advanced products, we perform the 
estimates only for HS industries.  
We regress the growth rates of market shares on the growth rates of relative prices and on a 
measure of trade partners’ “preference for quality”. In this respect, as in Hallak (2006 and 2010) 
and Crinò and Epifani (2010), we posit that the intensity of preference for quality – represented by 
ω in equation (14), is a logarithmic function of the importer per-capita income. This amounts to 
assuming that richer countries spend a larger fraction of their income on goods with a higher quality 
content. Given the results obtained in the first step, we are able to use the fitted values of 
vk
sUVRw
,ln∆ , obtained from the full OLS estimates (column 2 in Table 2), as the proxy for goods’ 
quality ratio. Consequently, in the estimation of the impact of the preference for quality on market 
share changes we take into account the technological variables through their impact on the UVRw.16  
We now denote the fitted values of UVRw as vk
swUVR
,ln∆ . We thus build a measure of the 
preference for quality (the ‘Linder term’) by interacting each industry’s vkswUVR ,ln∆  with the 
growth rate of per-capita GDP of the partner country. The above specification accounts for the 
dynamical perspective  of our analysis that focuses on the innovation-driven changes in the pattern 
of trade. This calls for two differences with respect to Hallak (2010). First, we use the fitted values 
of UVRw to proxy quality, instead of per-capita income, given our focus on countries that feature a 
relatively lower per-capita income than EU members’, despite the quality level of HS products is 
comparable to EU’s. In addition, since we showed that changes in the UVRw are closely related to 
the technological catching up of each sector, this variable represents more faithfully the underling 
dynamical tendencies taking place in the given sector. Secondly, we consider that the intensity of 
preference for quality may change between the initial and final year. Consequently, the preference-
for-quality term we consider in our estimation of the market shares changes is: 
                                               
16
 The use of the fitted values from the first step estimation has the additional advantage to correct the endogeneity bias 
of the UVRw coefficient. 
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The first two terms of the RHS are not significant because their impact is captured by the fixed 
effects; accordingly, we use only the term ( )vksv wUVRGDP ,lnln ∆∗∆  as a measure of the change in 
preference for quality.  
The equation we estimate is the following:  
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where vksMKTsh
,
 is the market share of the reporter country k in the partner country v .In the 
estimation vkswUVR
,ln∆ captures the traditional price effect,17 vksQDEMw ,  the preference for quality 
effect, and DCk, DCs and DCv are dummy variables for reporter countries k, sectors s and partners v, 
respectively. In particular, partners’ dummies include the impact of foreign GDP growth rate which 
has to be included as a main effect, being part of the interaction term vksQDEMw , . All variables of 
interest are expressed in logs, and therefore log differences represent growth rates between 2000 
and 2007. We carry out OLS regression. It is worth noting that, since we consider fixed goods, i.e., 
only products traded both in 2000 and 2007, market shares’ changes with respect to EU competitors 
measure a modification in the “intensive margin”.   
 The results - reported in Table 3- validate our assumption of a successful competitiveness in 
“quality-dominated” markets: the estimated coefficients are significant and of the expected sign, 
i.e., negative for the relative price term vkswUVR
,ln∆
 
and positive for the demand for quality term  
vk
sQDEMw , . The estimates are robust to the direct inclusion of technological variables, proving that 
the effect of technology on market shares operates through the variable used as a proxy for 
                                               
17
 As to the price effect, we use the fitted values of UVRw given that the variable has to be included as a main effect in 
the regression, being it part of the interacted variable QDEM.   
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quality.18 In conclusion, the empirical evidence highlights that quality competitiveness is a strong 
determinant of  CEECs’ market shares changes with respect to high-income EU-14 countries over 
the period considered. 
Table 3 - Determinants of CEECs-4 market shares’ changes in EU-14 imports    
High-skill industries 
vk
swUVR
,ln∆  -0.935*** -1.097*** -1.298*** 
 
[0.206] [0.203] [0.225] 
vk
sQDEMw ,  7.066** 7.687** 8.002** 
 
[3.281] [3.292] [3.159] 
α0 
0.203 -0.004 -0.314 
 
[0.225] [0.250] [0.313] 
dummies 
DCv DCk, DCv DCk, DCs, DCv 
N 
263 263 263 
R
2
 
0.150 0.179 0.276 
 Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
In the paper we consider the role of vertical innovation in the evolution of competitiveness 
in trade for emerging market economies undergoing a process of economic integration with 
technologically advanced countries. We first address the issue from a theoretical point of view, and 
then provide some empirical evidence of the main theoretical results by considering trade between 
CEECs and EU. We distinguish between HS industries where firms produce technologically 
advanced goods, thanks to research activity, and LS industries where firms manufacture traditional 
products. HS firms compete in “quality dominated” markets and non-price effects stemming from 
quality differences matter for market penetration, whereas LS firms rely on a standard cost 
competition. The model shows the role of supply of and demand for quality in shaping the pattern 
of trade; this turns out to depend, on one side, on the emerging economy’s ability to reduce its 
                                               
18
 Results are available upon request. 
 27
quality gap with respect to rich competitors, also thanks to knowledge spillovers fuelled by 
economic integration and, on the other side, on the partner’s intensity of quality preference.  
Our empirical investigation is carried out with reference to changes in market shares of 
CEECs products in EU markets over the period 2000-2007. Descriptive evidence suggests that HS 
firms have engaged successfully in innovation-driven competition in EU markets. We run an 
econometric analysis in two successive steps. We first test the assumption that UVRw is an adequate 
measure of quality, showing the existence of a systematic correlation with domestic and foreign 
technological variables. We then use the estimated UVRw to assess the role of preference for quality 
in CEECs-4’ exports towards EU markets, finding that the increase in HS market shares is 
significantly correlated to the intensity of quality preference of high-income EU countries. Our 
estimations definitely support the conclusions obtained in the theoretical model.  
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Appendix - Solution to the consumer’s static maximization problems. 
A) Allocation of expenditure for each product across quality levels 
In the first stage of utility maximization each consumer h allocates expenditure within-product 
quality levels, κ  and ∗κ , by solving the following static problem: 
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where hnE  and hnE ∗
 
are consumer’s expenditures in advanced domestic and foreign industries n and 
∗n , respectively, at time t, with  h
n n
h
n
h
n EEE∑ ∑
∗
∗ =+ α , and where ( )nHP ,κ  and ( )∗∗ nFP ,κ
 
are the prices 
of the brands κ  and ∗κ , and hEα  is consumer’s expenditure on advanced products. 
For any good n, utility maximization implies a positive demand only for the brand ( )h nHC ,κˆ
 
that 
carries the lowest quality-adjusted price: 
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for all vintages κκ ˆ≠  .  
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where ( )nHP ,κˆ  is the price of the brand κˆ  that carries the lowest quality-adjusted price.  
The consumer is thus indifferent between quality vintages κ  and 1−κ of any domestic product n if 
and only if ( )
( )
ω
κ
κ γ=
− nH
nH
P
P
,1
,
, where ( )
( )1−
=
κ
κγ
H
H
q
q
 is the increase in quality between two successive 
vintages. Same reasoning applies to choice among quality vintages of any foreign product ∗n . 
B) Allocation of expenditure across (state-of-the-art) products  
In the second stage, each consumer optimally allocates expenditure across the N domestic and ∗N  
foreign (state-of-the-art) advanced products. The demand function in equation (9) follows from the 
solution to the following static optimization programme:  
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where ( )∗∗ nFC ,κˆ
 
is the demand of the foreign brand ∗κˆ
 
that carries the lowest quality-adjusted price, 
and ( )∗∗ nFP ,κˆ
 
its price. The foreign consumer demand function for any domestic advanced product in 
equation (14) is obtained by solving an optimization problem analogous to the one above.  
